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Abstract
This paper empirically investigates the relationship between corruption,
political instability, and economic growth. We first show how these vari-
ables interact by allowing for bidirectional causality between each two of
the three variables for which we employ a panel VAR model on a dataset of
140 countries over the period of 1990-2017. Then, we exploit the incidence
of the Arab Spring, as an exogenous shock, to measure the short-term
effects of political shocks on corruption levels, political stability and eco-
nomic growth using the difference-in-differences (DiD) framework.
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JEL code: D72; D73; E02; O43; F43; O47
1. Introduction
Although there is ample evidence of its impacts, the economic effects of
corruption, especially on growth, continue to be a debatable topic in the
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literature. In this regard, the literature has suggested two different hypothe-
ses: sanding the wheels vs. greasing the wheels. While the former confirms5
such intuitive negative growth impacts, the latter suggests that corruption
can have some positive impacts on the economy by circumventing cumber-
some bureaucratic regulations. Many channels can explain the effects of
corruption on growth, such as investment and government expenditures.
For example, empirical evidence reported by Mauro [1998], Davoodi and10
Tanzi [2002] and Gupta et al. [2002] shows that corruption distorts govern-
ment expenditures towards less productive activities. Cooray et al. [2017]
finds that corruption has negative impacts on public debt. On the other
hand, Egger and Winner [2005] find that corruption stimulates foreign
direct investments, especially in low-income countries. Similarly, Mironov15
[2005] distinguishes between ‘bad‘ and ‘residual’ corruption where the lat-
ter is found to have positive growth impacts in countries with institutions
of poor quality.
Modeling corruption is not an easy task, and many of the existing20
research papers suffer severe limitations. For example, the relationship
between corruption and economic growth is likely to exhibit a bidirec-
tional type of causality and does not necessarily go only from corruption
to growth [Lucˇic´ et al., 2016]. Moreover, nothing can guarantee that the
relationship between both variables behaves in a linear fashion [Me´ndez25
and Sepu´lveda, 2006]. Regardless of this, institutions, especially political
settings in a given country, can be a fundamental determinant of corruption
and the rate of growth. Such relationships are already well documented in
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the literature. For example, Me´ndez and Sepu´lveda [2006] and Rock [2009]
find that corruption levels are peculiarly different between democratic and30
non-democratic countries. Nevertheless, while the relationship between
corruption and a country’s political settings can also be bidirectional, most
of the existing studies tend to overlook such intuition.
Unlike existing literature which tends to focus on growth impacts of35
either corruption or political settings separately, we show how the three
variables interact together simultaneously allowing for bidirectional causal-
ity between every two variables. In other words, while existing literature
focuses mainly on how corruption and political instability affect economic
growth, in this study, we ask a different set of questions: Does corruption40
lead to political unrest? Would political instability lead to higher levels
of corruption? Does growth lead to political stability and lower levels of
corruption? What are the effects of the Arab Spring on levels of corruption,
political stability, and economic growth in the MENA region? For the latter
question, the Arab Spring offers a unique opportunity to quantify this45
relationship in a quasi-natural experiment environment. In fact, to the best
of our knowledge, this is the first paper to exploit the incidence of the Arab
Spring to measure the effects of political instability on economic growth
and the level of corruption.
50
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews
the existing literature on defining and measuring corruption as well as
on the relationship between corruption, political stability, and economic
3
growth. Section 3 presents the dataset and summarizes the empirical
methodology. Our empirical results are summarized in section 4. Finally,55
section 5 concludes.
2. Literature Review
Corruption is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon that exhibits
different forms and shapes. It is a complicated term to define, and there is
no consensus on a single, comprehensive, universally accepted definition60
of what corruption could be. What is considered to be corrupt behavior in
a given society might not be seen in the same way in another, and there-
fore various interpretations of corruption exist [Iyer and Samociuk, 2016].
For example, the most blatant act of corruption is bribery which is strictly
prohibited and illegal in some countries while it might be still illegal but65
socially acceptable in other countries. Bribery in some societies turns to be
a way of life as, due to abysmal economic performance and institutions,
it becomes the only way to access public services. Even in most societies
where bribery is condemned and unacceptable, it is meant to be invisible,
and its victims are not easily identifiable. This unobservability adds an70
extra layer of complexity to any attempt in defining and measuring corrup-
tion.
Nevertheless, there are many attempts to put an acceptable definition
of the term ‘corruption.’ A commonly used definition is one that focuses75
on the action of abusing public power, roles, or resources to make personal
gains. This definition is adopted in many studies including the widely cited
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papers by Bardhan [1997] and Tanzi [1998]. Therefore, we adopt a similar
definition as discussed in section 3.
80
In addition to the difficulty in defining and measuring corruption as
discussed above, numerous studies attempt to identify the main causes
and effects of corruption. A large list of antecedents of corruption includes
political settings, governance systems, economic performance, and insti-
tutional quality. Inefficient and complex regulation systems, for instance,85
lead to higher chances of corrupt behavior by officials (see, Tanzi [1998];
Wei and Kaufmann [1999]; and Goel and Nelson [2010], among others).
Only a few attempts have been made to investigate the causal links, if any,
between economic growth and the spread of corruption. Ali and Isse [2002],
for example, report no statistically significant causality from growth to90
corruption. Another study by Aidt et al. [2008] finds that higher growth
rates reduce the incidence of corruption but only in the presence of ‘strong’
institutions. Similar results appear in Bai et al. [2013] where growth is
found to reduce corruption if ‘strong’ land rights exist.
95
With the exception of a few studies, most of the literature on the growth-
corruption nexus focuses on causality from corruption to economic growth
(not the other way around). And the majority of this work confirms the
distortionary growth impacts of corruption. For example, Pellegrini and
Gerlagh [2004] find that corruption slows down economic growth mainly100
through its detrimental impacts on investment and trade. Similar findings
are reported in Mo [2001]; Anoruo and Braha [2005]; Hodge et al. [2011];
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Egunjobi [2013]; Anh et al. [2016] and dAgostino et al. [2016].
On the other hand, political (in)stability and the quality of institutions105
matter for corruption. An early attempt to investigate how political settings
could be an essential determinant of corruption is Lederman et al. [2005]
where they find political stability to be associated with lower levels of
corruption. Asongu and Nwachukwu [2015] establish causal evidence of a
positive nexus between political stability and corruption control. Moreover,110
the findings in Campante et al. [2009] support evidence of a U-shaped rela-
tionship between political instability and economic growth after controlling
for the level of democracy.
Furthermore, there is also a group of studies that combine the three115
variables (i.e., corruption, political stability, and growth). Adefeso [2018]
find no statistically significant relationship between political instability and
economic development in African countries. Nurudeen et al. [2015] find a
unidirectional causality from political instability to economic growth in the
short-term while in the long-term causality runs from growth and political120
stability to corruption. Shabbir et al. [2016] find that corruption determines
both economic growth and institutional quality.
Our contribution to this large and extensive body of literature is as
follows. Unlike existing literature which tends to focus on growth im-125
pacts of either corruption or political settings separately, we show how the
three variables interact together simultaneously allowing for bidirectional
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causality between every two variables. Besides, we exploit the Arab Spring
incidence, and its associated political instability in the MENA region, to
quantify this relationship in a quasi-natural experiment environment. To130
the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to employ the incidence of
the Arab Spring to measure the effects of political instability on economic
growth and the level of corruption.
3. Data and Methods
3.1. The dataset135
As highlighted earlier (in sections 1 and 2), a major challenge facing
research on corruption is how to define, and consequently measure, the
term ‘corruption’. It is no doubt a difficult task to measure what is illegal
and meant to remain unseen. However, any empirical study has to be clear
about what is being captured and measured, and research on corruption140
is no exception. As mentioned in section 2, this study adopts a broad
and commonly used definition which identifies corrupt behavior based
on the incidence of abusing public resources to achieve private benefits
for officials. However, such a definition of corruption also sheds light
on the important role that institutions play in determining or combating145
corruption. Good and strong institutions would impose appropriate checks
and balances, which would, in turn, spur growth and limit corrupt behav-
ior. This intuition confirms the importance of studying the three variables
simultaneously allowing for bidirectional causality between each pair of
variables in our dataset.150
7
To address our research questions empirically, we collect a large dataset
of annual data which covers 140 countries between 1990 and 2017. The
main variables in our dataset include measures for corruption, institutional
quality, and economic growth.155
Following our definition of corruption, discussed earlier, we choose
to employ a measure that captures perceptions of the corruption taking
place by public officials. Therefore, we use the ‘pubcorr’ index of the V-Dem
database. The index, namely public sector corruption, builds on the view160
of a large number of experts to measure the perception of public officials
corrupt behaviour in a given country at a certain point in time1. The pubcorr
index takes values from zero to one, where a larger value denotes a higher
level of corruption.
165
To proxy for a country’s political settings we use the ‘poltiy’ index from
the Polity IV database Marshall et al. [2014]. The ‘poltiy’ index is avail-
able for a large number of countries over a long period, which perhaps
explains why it has been widely used in the literature. This index is based
on sub-scores for constraints on the chief executive, the competitiveness170
of political participation, and the openness and competitiveness of exec-
utive recruitment. The ‘poltiy’ score ranges from -10 to +10 with higher
values denoting more democratic institutions. The Polity Codebook de-
1Arguably, whatever definition one considers, focusing only upon one aspect of cor-
ruption (e.g. bribery) overlooks its breadth and complexity and therefore might limit our
understanding to such complex phenomenon. However, any empirical study has to be
specific on what is being measured. Our measure here reflects our definition of corruption.
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fines a polity within the range [6,10] as a coherent democracy, one in the
range [-10,-6] as a coherent autocracy, and one in the range [-5,5] as an175
incoherent regime. In our application, we rescale the ‘poltiy’ index to range
from 0 to 10 with larger values denoting a better quality institutional set-up.
Finally, we measure economic growth in a given country by its per
capita real income. Although it has been widely criticized for not being a180
‘good’ measure of the standard of living, the GDP is the most commonly
used measure to reflect economic growth. Table 1 shows the descriptive
statistics for the three variables described above.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
pubcorr 4153 0.5049285 0.3028824 0.0043169 0.9794533
polity 4153 6.674929 3.266204 0 10
gdp 4153 8.268439 1.555429 4.751814 11.62597
3.2. Empirical Methodology185
Since our dataset composes a panel data of 140 countries over the pe-
riod of 1990-2017, we begin our estimation by following the conventional
fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE) estimations for static panel data
models as well as the popular generalized method of moments (GMM) of
Arellano and Bond [1991] for dynamic panel data models.190
In addition to our baseline estimations (static and dynamic panels),
we employ a panel VAR modeling approach to examine how corruption,
9
growth and a country’s political settings interact allowing for bidirectional
causality between each pair of variables. A distinctive advantage of the195
VAR alike models is that all variables are sought to be endogenous and
interdependent. Thus, we have a three-equation system, and each equation
has one of our three variables as the dependent variable while the other
two variables appear on the right-hand side (in a lagged form) as the
explanatory variables. Our panel VAR model can be formally presented as200
follows.
Yit = A0i(t) +Ai(l)Yt−1 + it (1)
where Yit = (y′1t, y′2t, . . . , y′Nt)
′ is a G× 1 vector of endogenous variables,
i = 1, . . . , N & t = 1, . . . , T denoting country and time dimension
respectively, and uit = G × 1 is a vector of random disturbances where
it ∼ iid(0,Σ). By estimating the above model and running relevant di-205
agnostic tests, we shall then produce a set of impulse response functions
(IRFs) which explain how each variable responds to shocks to the other two
variables in the system.
Furthermore, we investigate how political instability affects both the210
levels of corruption and economic growth in a quasi-natural experiment
environment. More specifically, the Arab Spring offers a unique oppor-
tunity which we exploit to quantify the effects of political shocks on the
three variables of interest. For this purpose, we employ the Differences-
in-Differences (DiD) estimation to compare MENA countries (treatment215
group) with other countries (control group). A DiD regression-based esti-
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mator can be obtained by estimating the following equation.
yit = β0 + β1MENAi + β2shockt + β3MENAi.shockt + φXi + it (2)
Where yit is the outcome variable; MENAi is a dummy variable that
takes the value of one for the treatment group and zero otherwise; shockt
is a dummy that takes the value of one for year ≥ 2011 (post-treatment)220
and zero for year < 2011 (pre-treatment). The DiD estimator is the OLS
estimator of β3, the coefficient of the interaction term between MENAi and
Shockt. Xit can be a series of control variables.
To account for possible bias in the DiD estimator due to dealing with a225
large and quite heterogeneous group of countries, we apply the propensity
score matching (PSM) technique to estimate the average treatment effect
of the treated (ATT). The propensity score, in this context, can be defined
as the conditional probability of the incidence of a political shock given
pretreatment characteristics as follows.230
p(X) ≡ Pr(D = 1|X) = E(D|X) (3)
where D = {0, 1} is the indicator of exposure to a political shock and X
is the multidimensional vector of pretreatment country-specific characteris-
tics.
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4. Empirical results
4.1. Baseline Estimation: FE, RE and GMM235
Our first step in the estimation strategy is to apply the traditional panel
data estimation techniques before applying our three-equation system esti-
mated within a panel VAR framework. Since we acknowledge the fact that
causality between each pair of variables in our model may be bidirectional,
we maintain the principle of the three-equation system throughout. How-240
ever, it is worth noting that in contrast to our panel VAR estimation, the
results reported in the current subsection are obtained for each equation
separately.
Table 2 reports our fixed and random effects estimations for three sep-245
arate equations of GDP, polity and corruption indices. More specifically,
while models (1), (3) and (5) employ fixed effects (FE) estimations, models
(2), (4), and (6) are random effects estimations. For the GDP equation, both
estimations FE and RE estimations, confirm that while political settings
have a positive growth impact, corruption levels have negative effects on250
economic growth. Both effects are statistically significant at 1% level. The
second equation, of polity index as the dependent variable, shows that while
corruption contributes negatively to political settings, economic growth
would have a positive impact on political institutions. The third equation,
of the corruption index as the explained variable, shows that both better255
political institutions and higher levels of economic growth would be useful
in combating corruption. These findings are in line with our priori on the re-
lationship between corruption, political institutions, and economic growth.
12
Table 2: Fixed and Random Effects Estimations
Dep. Var. GDP polity Corruption
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FE RE FE RE FE RE
polity 0.037*** 0.038*** -0.004*** -0.005***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Corruption -0.301*** -0.390*** -0.891*** -1.153***
(0.052) (0.052) (0.243) (0.233)
GDP 0.806*** 0.757*** -0.028*** -0.047***
(0.073) (0.065) (0.005) (0.004)
Cons. 8.170*** 8.199*** 0.511 1.034* 0.753*** 0.918***
(0.036) (0.096) (-0.626) (0.606) (0.039) (-0.039)
N 4153 4153 4153 4153 4153 4153
However, since the above specifications (1-6) are estimated for each260
equation separately, exogeneity is presumed, and causality is expected to
run only in one direction and towards the dependent variable. Therefore,
the obtained estimations are likely to be biased if causality runs in both
directions or even if it is unidirectional but in the opposite direction. In
fact, empirical research discussed in section 2 shows that this is likely to be265
the case. Perhaps, this is why many studies on corruption and institutional
quality which use panel data models tend to employ a dynamic specifica-
tion in which lagged values of the dependent variable appear among the
regressors. In such cases, there is an endogeneity bias because the country
fixed effect term is likely to be correlated with the lagged dependent vari-270
able. Therefore, these sort of dynamic models is usually estimated using
the generalized method of moments (GMM) of Arellano and Bond [1991].
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Table 3: Arellano and Bond (1991) Two-Way Two Step GMM Estimations
(7) (8) (9)
Dep. Var. GDP polity Corruption
L5.GDP 0.915*** 0.261*** -0.118***
(0.002) (0.018) (0.001)
L5.polity 0.005*** 0.285*** -0.022***
(0.001) (0.007) (0.001)
L5.Corruption -0.179*** -1.596***
(0.012) (0.132)
Cons. 0.871*** 3.638*** 1.614***
(0.021) (0.213) (0.003)
Wald test 3402 3402 3402
Sargan OIR test 0.000 0.000 0.000
A-B AR1 FD test 0.000 0.000 0.000
A-B AR2 FD test 0.265 0.930 0.533
N 3402 3402 3402
Table 3 reports our GMM estimation for the three equations separately.
In this estimation, the fifth lag of the dependent variable appears as one275
of the independent variables. Yet, even after addressing the endogeneity
issue, our previous findings remain the same. More specifically, our GMM
estimation shows that while good political institutions have positive im-
pacts on economic growth, higher corruption levels would be detrimental
to economic growth. Similarly, our previous results hold for both political280
institutions and corruption.
4.2. Panel VAR Estimation: IRFs
To estimate our panel VAR model, Eq. 1, we follow the estimation
routine suggested in Abrigo et al. [2015], who build on the generalized
method of moments (GMM) framework. The authors apply forward or-285
14
thogonal deviation proposed by Arellano and Bover [1995] to remedy for
the weaknesses of the first-difference transformation when estimating dy-
namic panel models. We use information criteria to select the optimal lag
order (i.e., in both panel VAR specification and moment condition). Based
on the model selection criteria, first-order panel VAR is the preferred model,290
since it has the smallest value for the information criteria. Therefore, we fit
a first-order panel VAR model using the GMM estimator.
Since that panel VAR estimates are seldom interpreted independently,
we proceed to estimate the IRFs as we are interested in examining the295
relationship between corruption, political settings, and economic growth
within our system of equations. Although the simple IRFs have no causal
interpretation, a shock on one variable is likely to be accompanied by
shocks in other variables, as well, since the innovations it are correlated
contemporaneously. Fig. 1 presents the IRFs from our panel VAR model300
for all variables in the system along with its confidence bands. The IRF
confidence intervals are estimated using Gaussian approximation based on
500 Monte Carlo draws from the estimated panel VAR model.
The IRFs graphs shown in Fig. 1 correspond to our three-system equa-305
tion of endogenous variables estimated using the GMM method. The first
row in Fig. 1 shows the responses from one standard deviation (SD) shock
to the corruption index. The resulting IRFs show that increased levels of
corruption would have statistically significant negative impacts on both
GDP and the quality of institutions the second row in Fig. 1, which shows310
15
the IRFs from a 1SD shock to Polity index, provides evidence that stronger
institutions would increase GDP growth and decrease corruption levels.
Finally, the third row in the same graph presents the IRFs from a 1SD shock
to GDP growth rate. These IRFs show that higher economic growth rates
are accompanied by better quality institutions and lower levels of corrup-315
tion.
Figure 1: Impulse response functions (IRFs) - Shock : Response
Corr : GDP Corr : polity Corr : Corr
polity : GDP polity : Corr polity : polity
GDP : polity GDP : Corr GDP : GDP
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4.3. Quasi-Natural Experiment
The second objective of this paper is to estimate the short-term effects
of the Arab Spring on our three variables (i.e., corruption, institutional320
quality, growth) using the DiD framework (Eq. 2). Table 4 presents the
simple DiD estimation with no additional controls as well as the DiD esti-
mation for each equation after controlling for the other two variables. The
MENA coefficient provides an estimate of the difference in mean for the
outcome variable between the treated group (MENA countries) and the325
control group (non-MENA countries). The Arab Spring coefficient, which
corresponds to a dummy variable that is equal to one for the year 2011
and onwards, presents the difference in mean for the outcome variable
between post-treatment and prior treatment. The DiD coefficient presents
our differences-in-differences estimation.330
The DiD estimation for the GDP equation (models 10 and 11 in Table 4)
shows that the growth rate of per capita GDP has fallen in MENA coun-
tries (treated group) in response to the political instability in the region.
However, this drop in economic growth does not seem to be statistically335
significant. Moving to the DiD estimation for the Polity index, it seems that
there has been some improvement in the index as a result of the demands
for political reforms in the region. Our estimation appears to be significant
(at ten percent level) only when we control for economic growth rate and
the level of corruption (model 13). Considering the third equation of cor-340
ruption (models 14 & 15), the DiD estimation shows that there is a slight
drop in the level of corruption in MENA countries as a result of the Arab
17
Table 4: Diff-in-Diff Estimations - No matching
GDP polity Corruption
Dep. Var. (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
MENA 0.336*** 1.035*** -3.963*** -3.503*** 0.143*** 0.0840***
(0.0794) (0.0605) (0.152) (0.135) (0.0153) (0.0115)
Arab Spring 0.351*** 0.278*** 0.469*** 0.309** -0.0141 0.0379***
(0.0597) (0.0422) (0.114) (0.0985) (0.0115) (0.00781)
DiD -0.114 -0.155 0.589 0.614* -0.00241 -0.00104
(0.161) (0.114) (0.308) (0.264) (0.0310) (0.0210)
polity 0.0548*** -0.0247***
(0.00662) (0.00117)
Corruption -3.374*** -3.912***
(0.0657) (0.186)
GDP 0.297*** -0.115***
(0.0358) (0.00224)
Cons. 8.138*** 9.372*** 7.155*** 6.626*** 0.482*** 1.596***
(0.0299) (0.0721) (0.0572) (0.364) (0.00576) (0.0169)
N 4153 4153 4153 4153 4153 4153
Spring. However, the estimated coefficients are not statistically different
from zero. Other estimated coefficients (for polity, corruption, and GDP) do
not deviate from our results reported earlier in this paper (FE, RE, GMM,345
and Panel VAR).
Given the heterogeneity existing among countries in both groups (con-
trol and treatment), the DiD estimations reported in Table 4 are likely to be
biased. To account for this bias, we employ the propensity score matching350
(PSM), thereby maximizing the observable similarity between treatment
and control groups. As an alternative to linear regression, the PSM analysis
allows us to create the two groups that have similar characteristics so that
a comparison can be made within these matched groups. The implemen-
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tation of the PSM methodology follows the two-step procedure whereby,355
in the first step, each country’s probability (propensity score) of receiving
a political shock is assessed conditional to a set of explanatory variables.
For each equation, while one of our three variables of interest appears in
the left-hand side, we include the other two variables as controls within
the first stage of the model to ensure that the two groups are matched on360
similar characteristics (i.e., the level of corruption, institutional quality and
economic development process). Consequently, the treatment and control
group countries are matched on the basis of their propensity scores. We
present the results in Table 5 based on the kernel matching method. The
procedure involves taking each treated country (MENA) and identifying365
non-treated countries (non-MENA countries) with the most similar propen-
sity scores.
Table 5: Matching based Diff-in-Diff Estimations
(16) (17) (18)
Dep.Var. GDP polity Corr
MENA 1.214*** -3.275*** 0.072***
(0.073) (0.166) (0.015)
Arab Spring 0.547*** 0.097 0.011
(0.069) (0.196) (0.019)
DiD -0.330** 0.922*** -0.067**
(0.145) (0.353) (0.032)
Cons. 7.279*** 6.505*** 0.610***
(0.035) (0.097) (0.008)
N 3351 4000 3959
As the linear regression estimates in Table 4, the matching results in
19
Table 5 suggest that due to the political shock represented by the sequence of370
events known as the Arab Spring, the rate of growth in MENA countries has
fallen by 0.33% (mode 16), the Polity index, which represents institutional
quality, has increased by 0.922% (model 17), and the level of corruption has
dropped slightly by 0.067% (model 18).
5. Conclusion375
This paper provides new cross-country evidence on the relationship
between corruption, political settings, and economic growth. Unlike the
majority of the existing literature, we study how the three variables interact
simultaneously as well as separately. For this purpose, we use a large panel
dataset for 140 countries from 1990 to 2017 and follow the existing literature380
by applying the conventional fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE)
estimations for static panel models as well as the popular general method of
moments (GMM) for dynamic panel models. However, our main contribu-
tion to this large and extensive body of literature is twofold. First, we show
how corruption, political settings, and economic growth interact together385
simultaneously, allowing for bidirectional causality between every two
variables. For this purpose, we estimate a panel VAR model and produce a
set of impulse response functions (IRFs). Second, we exploit the incidence
of the Arab Spring as an exogenous shock which is associated with political
instability, to build up a quasi-natural experiment environment to measure390
the short-term effects of political shocks on our three variables of interest.
Our findings provide evidence of bidirectional causality between each
20
pair of our three variables of interest (i.e., corruption, political settings,
and economic growth). We show that higher levels of corruption will lead395
to reduced rates of economic growth and weak institutions. Moreover,
good and healthy institutions would boost growth and limit the spread of
corrupt behavior among officials. Our results also show that higher rates of
economic growth support institutional quality and help in combating cor-
ruption. Finally, our empirical findings suggest that while times of political400
instability are bad for economic growth, they might be taken as an oppor-
tunity to improve institutional quality and combat the spread of corruption.
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